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Abstract 
It is widely acknowledged among all echelons of
global organizations and governments alike, that
the Internet is a critical global infrastructure to the
information society. This critical global
infrastructure offers much to the twenty-first
century; however, it has already become
synonymous with misuse, abuse and the
emergence of a new vocabulary that includes
cyber terrorism, cyber trust, cyber fraud and
identity theft, to mention a few. Furthermore,
these vulnerabilities of the information society
(information infrastructure) have become more
prevalent in recent times.
Whilst this is not a desirable state for the
information society, it has focused attention on
internet identities. In particular, there is a growing
body of opinion that shares the view that it is the
cloak of anonymity that fuels such undesirable and
sometimes illegal use of our information
infrastructure (internet).
In short, this all adds up to a general mistrust of
the internet, especially where it concerns the
exchange of sensitive or confidential information.
If the internet is to mature into a trustworthy
utility-like infrastructure and a medium in which
both consumers and producers of information can
have implicit faith, then we must look to other
trusted utility infrastructures and services and the
way they operate. In general, these same
producers and consumers use electricity, water and
gas, for example, and rarely question the integrity
of those infrastructures that provide the life-
support to economic and social activity. These
critical services are regulated because of the
potential risk to public safety, and the consumers
and producers of such services are not
anonymous.
In contrast, cyber trust is now considered by
many observers to be a risk to public safety
because of our increasing dependence on the
internet. Yet we really cannot be sure about the
genuineness of the identities that participate in
information exchanges on the internet. In addition,
we cannot be confident that a person claiming to
be a doctor, lawyer or police officer, for example, is
their genuine role at any given time. There is also
general agreement emerging that some form of
regulation is now required in order to restore
confidence and trust in the internet as a safe
environment in which we can exchange
information. This leads us to many challenges, not
least of which is, how can we regulate anonymity?
This article will offer a view that it is the
registration business processes, employed to bind
real-world personal and professional data to a
digital certificate that is crucial. These registration
business processes are critical because they have a
direct bearing on the probative value of a digital
certificate. These registration business processes
will need to enable each information society
individual to declare his or her (or the
organizations’) genuine digital identities (digital
certificates) and contribute to a safer information
infrastructure by removing the opportunity for
identity theft and identity plagiarism that exists on
the internet today.
Such registration business processes will need to
consider carefully regulation and legislation, digital
identity (certificate) lifecycle management and
information assurance. The registration business
processes will need to scale and be available to all
real-world custodians of trust: those organizations
and employees engaged in the exchange of
sensitive medical, legal, scientific and commercial
information over the internet. Control of
registration would be done as part of a
Certification Authorities policy or certification
practice.
In the United Kingdom, tScheme is the industry-
led, self-regulatory, not-for-profit organisation that
was set up to create strict service criteria and to
approve electronic trust services, including qualified
certificate services. tScheme plays an important
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role by assuring that Trust Services meet rigorous
quality standards so that we can have confidence
in online identities.
The Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) landscape 
There is no doubt that the future of PKI and
digital signatures represents one of the more
complex technology and legal debates. The
spectrum of opinion ranges from a complex
technology in search of a problem, to a panacea,
to the challenge of establishing identity as we live
in a digital society.
Whilst PKI is a mature technology and has been
around for a number of years, it remains poorly
understood. PKI represents a single technology
solution to the problems surrounding
confidentiality, authentication and non-
repudiation; it is supported in most major technical
security standards; it is integrated into applications
such as Microsoft’s Windows Server 2003, and it is
one form of electronic signature that is acceptable
within the legal framework of the European Union
Directive on electronic signatures,1 adopted by
many of the Member State legislatures.
PKI provides us with an important security
component for enterprise security and overlaps
into other important areas such as secure login
with smart cards, file and folder encryption (EFS),
web services (SSL) and secure e-mail. 
Microsoft, for example, considers PKI as a core
technology for its future products, and their
approach has been to embed PKI as a core
infrastructure component. This Microsoft decision
to embrace PKI as a core component means that it
can be exploited transparently by many business
applications. More importantly, this will reduce
dramatically the costs of deployment and
administration of PKI, which is well known for
being an expensive technology. This is an
important enabler to widespread adoption of PKI
technology.
What concerns the Chief
Information Officer? 
There is an abundance of PKI technology
offerings from many vendors; however there
remains little appetite to adopt these PKI solutions
beyond internal perimeter security i.e. a closed
system. This is explained by the consensus
expressed by many leading Chief Information
Officers (CIOs). These CIOs hold responsible
positions in large multinational companies and
they are not complacent. It is their view that PKI is
too expensive, difficult to implement and not user
friendly. More importantly, even successful internal
deployments of PKI, referred to as closed systems,
have no return on investment.
It is the potential for increased efficiencies in
complex supply chains and commercial exchanges
with customers over the Internet (an open system),
where returns on investment will lie. This
represents a fundamental shift in the context of
the problem to be solved. More precisely, the
scope of this problem domain extends beyond that
which PKI alone can solve.
This shift, from one of internal use of PKI
technology and digital certificates to bolster
perimeter and internal security, to using this
technology with their supply chains and
customers, introduces further challenges. This
exposure places an increased emphasis on the
significance of information assurance about those
digital identities, which will later be relied upon. 
It is now more commonplace for the CIO to be
a member of the board of directors who share
responsibility for corporate governance. Corporate
governance needs control of, and assurance
about, the information upon which it basis its
decisions. The organization needs to know that
information is from a genuine and trustworthy
source. To know that the source of information is
genuine is to know that identity of that source is
genuine.
This can be summarised as follows: corporate
governance requires information governance;
information governance requires information
assurance and information assurance requires
identity assurance. Many CIOs highlight the
limitations of a PKI technology alone, when it
comes to linking a digital certificate to our
personal, professional and corporate notion of
identity, in order to prove we are who we say we
are, and prove we are what we say we are, to the
outside world. PKI and digital certificates are
employed to secure websites and servers with little
difficulty. However, binding a digital certificate with
a person or an organization’s identity is an entirely
different challenge that raises many problems that
are more business and legal, rather than a
technology issue alone, and for which there is no
appealing software solution.
Invariably, these challenges concern the
information assurance aspects of the digital
certificate content. Who controls the registration
process? What control does the individual have
over the content and accuracy of his or her digital
certificate? 
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Many other end-user issues translate into: how
safe is my personal data; collection of evidence of
identity seems to be arbitrary; collection of
evidence of identity is for the most part a manual
process; it is difficult to understand why a digital
certificate can be trusted; there is too little
transparency. In short, it is too much trouble and
too labour intensive, particularly for large
organizations.
These are significant barriers to the widespread
adoption of digital certificates for both individuals
and organizations. An efficient, automated
registration business process that is consistent,
transparent and user-friendly, would go some way
towards solving the problems. Such a registration
business process would need to offer full lifecycle
digital certificate management. Furthermore, if the
registration business process were to implement
the burden-of-compliance on behalf of the
organization, this would be significant to
overcoming these obstacles.
Registration
A robust registration business process, if
supported by a software system, would serve to
allay many of those genuine societal fears about
identity management, whilst at the same time
engaging their vital cooperation in declaring their
digital identities. This is crucial to removing the
cloak of anonymity that plagues the internet.
Fundamental to any registration business
process solution is the International
Telecommunication Union's ITU-T Recommendation
X.509v3 (1997) | ISO/IEC 9594-8: Information
technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The
directory: Public-key and attribute certificate
frameworks (‘X.509v3’). This technical standard
underpins any viable solution. However, on its
own, this standard is not intended as the solution
to the additional challenges of registering people
and organizations for digital certificates.
The business of registering individuals and
organizations for digital certificates involves
processing personal, professional and other data
that may be conferred on individuals in the context
of employment or some other affiliation. The
scope of any solution that binds real-world identity
data to digital certificates now includes observing
all the legal and regulatory requirements
associated with processing such data.
What has become increasingly important, and
the focus of attention of many CIOs, is the
significance of a registration layer that is part of
the underlying PKI technology; the registration
business process. Like any legislation, the legal
requirements are expressed in a technology-neutral
fashion. It is also worth noting that the application
of such legal requirements is not necessarily
confined to the United Kingdom and Europe. In
addition, as examples, there are specific sector
requirements such as the European Health
Informatics Standards (ISO Technical Committee
215 on Health Informatics) and the requirements
of International Air Transport and Aerospace (IATA
Standardising Digital Certifications in Global Air
Transport - The Digital Certification Working Group
(DCWG)).
In terms of European Health Informatics
Standards, our personal medical information is
regarded as the most sensitive information that is
now exchanged over the internet. The healthcare
industry is rigorous in its efforts to provide
appropriate protection for that data conveyed
across the internet in a practical, cost-effective
way. It is no surprise to find that this standard
(International Standards Organization Technical
Committee 215 on Health Informatics three-part
specification Health Informatics - Public Key
Infrastructure 2001) is lengthy and rich in the
detail of what is required of a registration business
process.
The Digital Certification Working Group
(DCWG) of IATA’s Standardising Digital
Certifications in Global Air Transport is a
subcommittee of the Aerospace Focus group that
was given a task in 1999 to come up with a
standard methodology for the acceptance of
X.509 Certificates and digital signatures. Since
then, the committee has been informally adopted
by the International Air Transport Association
TICC-DART group, as well as IATA’s E-Business
Initiative. This international collaboration includes
such names as Rolls Royce, British Airways, Boeing,
Airbus and General Electric, who have worked
together to agree common requirements for their
sector. tScheme also provides many service
approval profiles, one of which is the ‘Profile for
Registration Services’ that defines the requirements
for the verification and registration of identity and
other attributes. A registration business process
will be expected to meet these general and sector
specific requirements.
The business of registration:
United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, the registration process
will need to consider carefully new and emerging
legislation. The following is not an exhaustive list,
and registration will need to be transparent about
observing such legal requirements: as the
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Electronic Communications Act 2000; Electronic
Signatures Regulations 2002; Data Protection Act
1998; Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
and Freedom of Information Act 2000.
Further to these legal requirements, the central
sponsor for information assurance in the Cabinet
Office of the United Kingdom government has
developed and issued guidance documents on the
government’s requirements for the verification of
identity.2 These documents, which are detailed
technical documents supporting the Registration
and Authentication Framework, describe the
minimum evidence that needs to be presented by
an organization or an individual in order to be
issued with a digital certificate: a digital certificate
which, it can be said with degrees of confidence, is
genuine.
A registration business process can provide
digital certificates that have a higher degree of
probative value if the registration process is
transparent, offers regulatory compliance, and
information assurance about the genuineness of
digital certificates to owners and recipients.
The probative value of a digital certificate is
partly judged on the basis of the registration
process. What is important and helpful to
recipients is to be able to see enough meaningful
information in a digital certificate to support any
judgement about the probative value of that
certificate. They also need to be assured about the
accuracy of the information declared in the digital
certificate. Furthermore, when a recipient is aware
that the registration process has captured more
information than that declared in the associated
digital certificate, which can be made available to
the recipient, this contributes further to the
evidential or probative value and trust.
Recipients can decide whether to trust such a
digital certificate because they trust and have
confidence in a rigorous and transparent process
of registration that the owner of the certificate
went through before being issued a digital
certificate. Moreover, when the registration process
is controlled and operated by the employing
organization, for instance, which has a vested
interest in the good stewardship of all matters
relating to their e-business, this too can be well
received by recipients. This approach serves to
build on the real-world relationships that already
exist between the parties.
The evidential value of a
digital certificate: an e-
conveyancing lawyer 
The legislation contained in the Land
Registration Act 2002 covers the groundwork for
e-conveyancing, by giving equal status to
electronic versions of the documents currently
used in the conveyancing process. The following
example illustrates what is meaningful to recipients
such as solicitors, conveyancers, lenders and
possibly Land Registry staff, when engaged in e-
conveyancing transactions.
Wragge & Co is a law firm and keen advocate
of the emerging e-conveyancing market. Figure 1
illustrates their signing certificate that they use to
sign employees’ digital certificates requests during
their registration process. David Pettingale is such a
partner at Wragge & Co.
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2 The reader is referred to http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/csia/ for further detail. See also, at the time of writing, 
further detail is available at the following links: UK HMG's Registration & Authentication Framework v 3.0 
http://www.knowledgenetwork.gov.uk/co/kimscsia.nsf/0/B372BF9C716556F980256EB60051ADD5/$FILE/ 
Registration & Authentication V3.0 Sept 2002.pdf?openelement; UK HMG's minimum requirements for the 
verification of the identity of Individuals
http://e-government.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/assetRoot/04/00/08/52/04000852.pdf; UK HMG's minimum 
requirements for the verification of the identity of organizations http://e-government.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ 
assetRoot/04/00/08/55/04000855.pdf.
Figure 1: 
The Wragge
& Co LLP
signing
certificate is
highlighted
Figure 2:
David
Pettingale’s
digital
certificate
The subject of a digital certificate, highlighted in
figure 3, declares that David Pettingale is a partner of
the firm and is employed in Property Development.
In this instance, a transaction limit and currency are
also declared. This level of detail is helpful to
recipients when making a judgement about the
evidential value of David’s digital certificate.
Figure 4: David Pettingale’s Law Society number, place of
birth, date of birth, country of citizenship and country of
residence are declared
Figure 5: The results of a search on the Law Society’s website
Figure 5 illustrates that David Pettingale is a
current member of the Law Society of England
and Wales. However, the ultimate source of
authority on his current role and responsibilities is
the employing organization, Wragge & Co. who
registered, processed and issued his digital
certificate.
Federated identity
management 
Trust belongs to people and organizations,
rather than technology. The significance of a
registration process is that it is a socio-technical
solution that fosters ‘Federated Identity
Management for the Information Society’. It is an
answer that is owned and operated by
organizations in their role as custodians of their
digital identities. However, the challenge to the
software and technology community is to provide
such a socio-technology (not merely a technology)
so that organizations and people have the
autonomy to manage and control it.
It is the absence of a formal, consistent,
transparent, efficient and auditable system of
registration that utilises standard cryptography and
PKI that deters many organizations from adopting
PKI on a large-scale. It is important to
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Figure 3: the registration process stores the additional
registration data that corroborates the claim ‘This identity is
verified beyond reasonable doubt in accordance with
government criteria’ declared in David Pettingale’s digital
certificate
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organizations that a system of registration is
capable of dealing with greater volumes of
transactions so that they can accrue the many
benefits that PKI can offer them.
There are both common and variant
complexities involved in binding genuine real-
world identities with digital certificates. In addition
to technical standards such as ITU-T X509, it is the
new and emerging legislation that a registration
process needs to consider carefully.
The vulnerabilities of the information society
(information infrastructure) can largely be
attributed to a cloak of anonymity that
discourages many of us from exchanging sensitive
information using the internet. We, as an
information society (individuals, information
workers, organizations and decision makers), can
help remove the cloak of anonymity by registering
and claiming our own digital identities. This is a
small effort by each individual that collectively can
have an effect on the information society. It
reduces the opportunity for identity theft.
Information is the life-support to decision-
making; we usually trust information because we
know and trust the identity of the source of that
information. We need to claim and protect our
own digital identities so that we can continue to
be trusted as the genuine identity (genuine source
of information) when using the internet. n
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